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The Federal Aviation Administration is in the process of replacing the
current Air Traffic Management (ATM) system with a new system known as
NextGen. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is the aircraft
surveillance protocol currently being introduced as a part of the NextGen system
deployment. The evolution of ADS-B spans more than two decades, with
development focused primarily on increasing the capacity of the Air Traffic Control
(ATC) system and reducing operational costs. Security of the ADS-B
communications network has not been a high priority, and the inherent lack of
security measures in the ADS-B protocol has come under increasing scrutiny as the
NextGen ADS-B implementation deadline draws near.

The research conducted in this thesis summarizes the ADS-B security
vulnerabilities that have been under recent study. Thereafter, we survey both the
theoretical and practical efforts which have been conducted concerning these
issues, and review possible security solutions. We create a classification of the
ADS-B security solutions considered and provide a ranking of the potential
solutions. Finally, we discuss the most compatible approaches available, given the
constraints of the current ADS-B communications system and protocol.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been
working on a replacement for the current air traffic control (ATC) system in a project
known as NextGen. Developed in cooperation with other aviation agencies, the goal of
NextGen is to shift air traffic surveillance and management technology away from an
infrastructure based on radar to one that obtains position information from a Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). This surveillance paradigm shift offers the potential
to reduce deployment and maintenance costs, while at the same time increase both the
capacity and safety of the global air traffic system.
General Issue
The new ATC surveillance system being deployed as part of NextGen is called
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). The key issue with ADS-B is that
it was not developed with security as a priority, leaving it susceptible to a number of
different radio frequency (RF) attacks. Recent research has demonstrated the ease of
compromising the security of ADS-B using inexpensive Universal Software Radio
Peripheral (USRP) hardware and Open Source software [1], [2].
These vulnerabilities are generating increasing concern as the deadline for full
compliance by the aviation industry draws near. The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) has mandated all aircraft in European airspace be equipped with ADS-B by 2017,
1

while the FAA has set 2020 as its implementation target. In addition, countries such as
Australia have already deployed full continental coverage, with ADS-B surveillance being
the sole means of ATC in sparsely populated regions of the country. Although aviation
agencies previously estimated that 70-80 percent of commercial aircraft worldwide
would be equipped with ADS-B by 2013 [3], a recent report by the Department of
Transportation’s Inspector General [4] indicates that compliance within the aviation
industry is running behind schedule. The report cites concerns over system
vulnerabilities as one of the principle causes for fleet-wide delays in ADS-B equipment
installation.
Problem Statement
The implementation of a new aircraft surveillance system is a non-trivial,
decades-long process that has far reaching implications on all segments of the aviation
industry. Not only is there a substantial cost in developing and deploying the system
infrastructure, there are significant synergies required within the industry to train flight
crews and air traffic controllers on the use of the new system.
As reported in [4], the security shortcomings in ADS-B are creating uncertainty
within the aviation community and reluctance toward making a commitment to
complying with the NextGen deployment plan. As the timetable for the scheduled
implementation of ADS-B grows shorter, solutions to address the vulnerabilities in ADSB must be found. Potential approaches must be evaluated from both a security and a
cost standpoint. Therefore, feasible solutions must strike a balance between security
2

improvement and compatibility with the current ADS-B communications system.
Research Objectives
The purpose of this research is to review the strengths and weaknesses of
proposed ADS-B security schemes, considering both the security offered by the scheme
and its compatibility with the current air traffic management (ATM) system
infrastructure. We begin with a discussion of the ATM system in Chapter 2, giving an
overview of the evolution of our ATC system, NextGen and the ADS-B protocol. In
Chapter 3 we present a summary of the ADS-B vulnerabilities that have been discussed
in the recent literature. Building on this discussion, a model of the ADS-B network is
outlined in Chapter 4 and the required security attributes of the network are identified.
In Chapters 5 and 6, we discuss the various ADS-B security proposals. We conclude our
research in Chapter 7, where we develop a ranking system to evaluate the various
security schemes and identify the most beneficial approaches, considering their security
features and cost-effectiveness of the various proposals.
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CHAPTER 2
AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OVERVIEW

Air Traffic Control System History
Our current air navigation and ATC systems trace their origins back to the 1920s.
During this early period in air navigation, the Post Office Department utilized lighted
beacons as a navigational aid to pilots flying postal delivery aircraft at night. In the
1930s these visual aids were replaced by non-directional radio beacons (NDBs), which
transmit pulses of electromagnetic energy modulated with Morse Code.
By the late 1930s commercial air travel was becoming a popular mode of
transportation and the volume of air traffic increased dramatically. As it became more
difficult to keep track of the increasing number of aircraft in operation, the airlines
developed a system of radio stations to help monitor their en route air traffic. These
initial radio stations were located in Chicago, Newark and Cleveland and were the
precursor to our current air traffic control system. The Bureau of Air Commerce
acquired the radio stations in 1936 and in so doing formed what is considered the First
Generation of ATC.
This First Generation ATC system consisted of no automation and very little radar
coverage. The fledgling ATC system relied on manual methods of tracking aircraft using
progress strips for each flight. By the late 1950s the volume of aircraft in operation had
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increased to the point that manual tracking was no longer feasible. In 1959 the Second
Generation ATC system was introduced, which automated many of the flight monitoring
tasks through the use of computers for processing air traffic data and ground based
radar to help track individual aircraft. Two years later, another major improvement to
the ATC system was made when the FAA incorporated ground based equipment to
interrogate a transponder located on the aircraft, allowing each air traffic radar target to
be uniquely identified.
In the late 1960s, air traffic was again taxing the capabilities of the National
Airspace System (NAS). By the early 1970s, advances in computer technology made it
possible for Upgraded Third Generation development (UG3d) of the ATC system. UG3d
provided the FAA with the ability to upgrade equipment used in both the terminal and
en route air traffic control structures. Through the increased automation of controller
tasks and the ability to receive timely flight tracking information, UG3d enabled air
traffic controllers to safely accommodate and monitor the increasing volume of air
traffic.
Air Traffic Control System Today
With the exception of introducing Global Positioning System (GPS) technologies
in the late 1990s, the current NAS infrastructure has undergone few changes since the
improvements incorporated into UG3d. Currently the NAS consists of a large number of
facilities including approximately 750 ATC installations, over 18,000 airports and more
than 4,500 air navigation stations. The 750 ATC facilities are comprised of 21 Air Route
5

Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs), 197 Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)
facilities, more than 450 airport control towers and numerous Flight Service Station
(FSS) facilities.
ARTCCs are responsible for controlling en route traffic within designated control
sectors, with the majority of the en-route traffic traveling along designated airways at
and above 18,000 feet. TRACON facilities control aircraft within an approximate 30
nautical mile radius of the larger airports within the ATC system, while airport control
towers are responsible for controlling aircraft within a 5 nautical mile radius of the
airport. FSS facilities are auxiliary components of the ATC system and provide general
information to pilots such as weather and traffic advisories.
Current NAS aircraft surveillance techniques fall into three basic categories:
Procedural ATC, Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) and Secondary Surveillance Radar
(SSR). Procedural ATC is what is known as a dependent surveillance technique, which
means it depends on input from individual aircraft. With Procedural ATC, pilots are
required to periodically report their position using radio communications, and it is
predominately used for oceanic and remote area flight operations where there is little
or no radar coverage. PSR is a non-cooperative and independent surveillance system
typically used by TRACON facilities and in busy terminal areas. These high definition
radar systems determine aircraft position via target range and azimuth from the station
and do not depend on any input from the aircraft. SSR is a cooperative and partiallyindependent surveillance system typically used for en-route tracking by ARTCCs. The
6

SSR radar system is a lower-resolution system than PSR, and determines aircraft position
through a combination of radar target return and aircraft transponder reply when
interrogated by a ground station.

Many of the current ATC facilities have been in service for more than 50 years.
These installations, and in particular the ground-based SSR and PSR radar systems, are
very costly to operate and maintain. Increased air traffic, aging equipment and a desire
to leverage technological advancements necessitate a comprehensive overhaul to the
NAS. In its current form, the air transportation system performs adequately but it is
once again approaching its capacity limits. Without a makeover, the expected growth in
air traffic will likely create costly flight delays and increased flight safety hazards.
NextGen and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
In response to these concerns, the FAA began the development of NextGen,
which incorporates new technologies to meet anticipated future NAS demands. The
primary goal of NextGen is to significantly increase the safety and capacity of the air
traffic management system. The upgrade incorporates a fundamental conversion of the
entire NAS, including the addition of satellite-based technologies for surveillance
operations and the shutdown of many legacy ground-based radar systems currently in
use. A key component of NextGen is the position reporting and tracking offered by ADSB.

7

The ADS-B surveillance system is automatic in that it requires no pilot or
controller intervention. It is dependent surveillance because the aircraft provides input
to the air traffic control system based on information derived from the aircraft’s GPS
receiver. As a broadcast protocol, ADS-B will continually transmit an updated position
and other data to nearby ground stations and aircraft on a regular interval. This
broadcast occur every several hundred milliseconds, compared with PSR which updates
aircraft position information once every 4 to 5 seconds. As a result, ADS-B provides
much a higher surveillance rate and accuracy than PSR and SSR. For example, at
distance of 60 nautical miles from the ground station, ADS-B provides ±20 meters of
precision compared to ±300 meters offered by the SSR radar system.
ADS-B has the potential to improve safety through enhanced pilot and controller
situational awareness, better inflight collision and runway incursion avoidance, and the
ability to implement accurate ATC surveillance in remote geographic areas with no
current radar coverage. Better position monitoring accuracy should allow the air traffic
control system to handle a higher volume of aircraft through condensed aircraft
separation standards, more direct traffic routings and optimized departures and
approach procedures. Another potential benefit of the NextGen ADS-B infrastructure is
a reduction in air traffic control system maintenance and operating costs, since the new
system is comprised of simple UHF radio stations that are significantly cheaper to install
and maintain than the aging surveillance radar ground stations [5].
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ADS-B System Description
The FAA’s NextGen implementation plan includes a network of approximately
800 ADS-B ground stations, placed 150 to 200 miles apart. These stations will receive
signals from two competing ADS-B data link standards: Universal Access Transceiver (UAT)
and Extended Squitter (1090ES).

The UAT data link was specifically designed for ADS-B

and has a much larger (272-bit) message data block than 1090ES (56-bit) in order to
accommodate supplementary aviation services information. It establishes a channel
with a data rate of 1 Mbps and operates at 978 MHz. The message format of UAT is
incompatible with any existing ATM system protocol, and thus requires aircraft to be
equipped with new avionics.
To minimize the cost impact on commercial and military aviation fleets, the FAA
decided to employ a separate data link protocol based on an existing interrogation
equipment mechanism in the SSR Mode S transponder called extended squitter. The
term squitter refers to the periodic broadcast of aircraft tracking data. When a Mode S
transponder is interrogated by SSR, its response to the interrogation message is called a
squawk. The transponder also periodically sends out aircraft tracking data without
being interrogated in what is called a squit transmission. The 1090ES protocol extends
the original 56-bit Mode S message to 112-bits, hence the term extended squitter.

9

Figure 1. ADS-B protocol hierarchy [6].
The relationship between the Transponder and ADS-B protocols is shown in
Figure 1. The purpose here is to show the relationship between the legacy transponder
components Mode 3/A, Mode C and Mode S, as well as to emphasize that the 1090ES
protocol is built on the existing Mode S protocol. It also demonstrates that the UAT
protocol is a completely separate protocol from 1090ES. Table 1 shows the relative
message sizes for the existing transponder protocols and the two ADS-B protocols.

Table 1. Comparison of Transponder Modes to ADS-B [7].
10

The 1090ES protocol is based on the traditional Mode S system and adds the
message fields for ADS-B surveillance data, which allows the ADS-B function to be
incorporated in current Mode S transponders. Since it is based on existing avionics
equipment, the cost of equipping a fleet of aircraft with 1090ES is substantially less than
it would be for purchasing entirely new UAT-compatible avionics.
ADS-B is separated into two functional operations; ADS-B OUT and ADS-B IN.
ADS-B OUT is the continuous broadcast of aircraft position data along with identity,
altitude, speed and rate of climb/descent. ADS-B IN is an optional service that allows
properly equipped aircraft to receive and display detailed information on other aircraft
operating in the same area (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Overview of ADS-B system architecture [7].
11

To facilitate interoperability between aircraft using different frequencies, the
system incorporates a support component called Automatic Dependent SurveillanceRebroadcast (ADS-R). ADS-R receives the traffic information broadcasts on the
1090MHz or 978 MHz links and rebroadcasts the information to aircraft on the opposite
data link frequency [8], [7]. Since the UAT protocol will primarily be used by general
aviation aircraft, we will limit our discussion of ADS-B security solutions to the 1090ES
protocol.
The 1090ES data link utilizes a standardized message format and transmission
protocol, consisting of a preamble (consisting of two synchronization pulses) followed
by a 112 bit message, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. 1090ES Data Link Message Format.
The downlink format field DF (alternatively UF for uplink messages) assigns the type of
the message. A downlink format value of 17 indicates that the message is an extended
squitter, enabling the transmission of 56 arbitrary bits in the Data Block field. The CA
field indicates information about the capabilities of the Mode S transponder, while the
24 bit AA field carries the unique International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aircraft
address which enables aircraft identification. Finally, the PI-field provides a 24 bit cyclic
12

redundancy check (CRC) to detect and correct possible transmission errors. Using the
24-bit parity information and a fixed generator polynomial of degree 24, it is possible for
recipients to correct up to 5 bit errors in 1090ES messages [7]. This error correction
limit is important, as any message exceeding 5 bit errors is dropped as a corrupt
message. Currently the message drop rate in the ADS-B network is about 33%, so there
are a significant number of bit errors occurring in the ADS-B messages. The majority of
these errors appear to be the result of congestion on the ADS-B communication
frequencies.
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CHAPTER 3
ADS-B VULNERABILITIES

The initial development to extend the Mode S protocol for use in the ADS-B
surveillance system was begun over 20 years ago [9]. At the time, the primary concern
of the developers was on increasing the ATC surveillance system operational capacity,
reliability, accuracy and range [10]. There was no emphasis on providing security to the
new system, and as a result ADS-B contains many security weaknesses that potential
attackers can exploit. These vulnerabilities inherently stem from the nature of
broadcast communication when used without additional security measures. Unlike
traditional point-to-point wired networks which present physical access barriers, there
are no impediments for an attacker trying to access a wireless broadcast network. The
security issues caused by the open nature of the ADS-B network are compounded by the
fact that the messages are broadcast as unencrypted plaintext.
As a result of the broadcast characteristics and unencrypted message format of
the network, access control mechanisms for ADS-B are very challenging to implement.
Adding to the security problems caused by accessibility, recent work by Magazu [2] and
Costin et al. [1] demonstrates that the widespread obtainability of inexpensive RF
implementation hardware and software has facilitated the ability of hackers to design
successful exploits. In the remainder of the chapter we present an overview of the
various ADS-B passive and active attack vulnerabilities, discussed in increasing order of
14

difficulty and complexity [7].
Eavesdropping
Passive listening to the unsecured transmissions is the simplest and most direct
form among the many security vulnerabilities present in ADS-B. Since ADS-B messages
are sent plaintext over a broadcast communications network, the protocol’s
susceptibility to eavesdropping is well known and has been a topic of discussion since its
early development. Although many aviation services and hobbyists gather and
disseminate this information with non-nefarious intentions, reconnaissance through
passive listening often forms the basis for a number of more sophisticated network
attacks. By combining ADS-B provided data with other publicly available data sources
(e.g. official databases provided by aviation authorities), attackers can retrieve enough
information to launch targeted attacks [6]. On a broadcast network, eavesdropping is
practically impossible to detect and is difficult to prevent without fully encrypting the
data.
Jamming
Jamming is an active attack that is slightly more complex than eavesdropping,
affecting either a single node or multiple nodes in an area of a wireless network. In a
jamming attack an adversary disrupts the transmission and reception of messages by
sending a sufficiently high-powered signal on the wireless frequency. While jamming is
a problem common to all wireless communications, the impact on aviation is
exacerbated by unrestricted access to system’s wide open spaces as well as the time15

critical nature of the transmitted data.
The two basic categories of jamming attacks on ADS-B are Ground Station Flood
Denial and Aircraft Flood Denial. The intent of both of these attacks is to disrupt the
communications frequency and effectively block the surveillance network. Since an
adversary can gain close proximity to a ground station, a Ground Station Flood Denial
attack is the easier of the two for an adversary to employ. Jamming a ground station
can be accomplished using much lower power on the frequency than is required to
target an airborne node. Aircraft Flood Denial is slightly more difficult, as the adversary
does not have ease of proximity to the target. A successful attack requires a much
higher powered signal jamming device, and is most likely to pose a threat to landing and
departing aircraft rather than en-route traffic.
Message Injection
Although slightly more difficult to conduct than jamming attacks, recent research
by Magazu [2] and Costin et al. [1] detailed the relative ease of injecting non-legitimate
messages into the air-traffic communication system using simple and readily available
technology. Since no authentication measures are implemented at the data link layer,
there is essentially no obstacle for an attacker in building a transmitter that is able to
produce correctly modulated and formatted ADS-B messages [7]. As with jamming
attacks, message injection attacks can target both ground-based and airborne targets,
producing illegitimate ghost targets that appear as valid nodes to the network
participants.
16

Message Deletion
Higher up on the difficulty scale are Message Deletion attacks, where legitimate
messages are removed from the wireless network using either destructive or
constructive interference. In a constructive interference attack, the adversary attempts
to obscure the sender’s transmission by causing a large number of bit errors. The
theory behind a constructive interference attack is to cause a sufficient number of
errors so that the receiver sees the message as corrupt and drops the message. Since
Mode S extended squitters’ CRC can correct a maximum of 5 bit errors per message, an
adversary will be successful if they can cause a message to exceed this threshold.
In contrast to generating bit errors, a destructive interference attack tries to
mask network communications messages by transmitting the inverse of the signal
broadcast by a legitimate sender. The theory behind destructive interference is that by
transmitting an inverse signal, the sender’s signal will be highly attenuated and
obscured. In practice, destructive interference is extremely challenging to implement,
due to very precise and complex timing requirements. Unlike destructive interference,
constructive interference does not require precise time synchronization and tends to be
more effective. The end result of both of these attacks is that, from the perspective of
the network participants, a node that was previously part of the network suddenly
disappears [7].

17

Message Modification
The most difficult vulnerabilities to exploit are those involving ADS-B message
modification. These attacks are complex to successfully implement because they
typically require the attacker to access the ADS-B network communications hardware
during message transmission, which is much more difficult to accomplish. There are
two different approaches that an attacker can use for message modification:
Overshadowing and Bit-Flipping. An attacker employs overshadowing by sending a highpowered signal that is precisely timed with the transmission of the target message. This
has the effect of replacing the target message in whole or in part, allowing the sender’s
message to be modified or replaced entirely. When an adversary uses bit-flipping, the
attacker converts any number of bits from 1 to 0 (or the other way around) by
superimposing a false signal over the original signal. In both cases arbitrary data can be
injected into the network without the knowledge of any of the participants. This effect
can also be achieved by combining message deletion and injection, but message
modification at the ADS-B network communications hardware level can be regarded as
more problematic than the injection of a completely new message, since the
manipulated message was originally considered legitimate by the network [7].
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CHAPTER 4
ADS-B SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

The challenges to addressing security problems in ADS-B stem from its open
broadcast architecture and the need for security schemes to integrate into the
operational characteristics of the existing air traffic management system. In order to
describe the security requirements of the ADS-B communications network, we begin by
identifying the properties of the network as outlined by Strohmeier et al. [7] and then
discuss the security attributes needed to adequately address the vulnerabilities in the
system.

ADS-B Network Properties
The ADS-B network is a mobile ad hoc network (MANET), consisting of a large
and variable number of highly mobile nodes moving at velocities of 500 mph 1 or more.
Due to the speed and mobility of its nodes, the ADS-B network is extremely dynamic,
with very short duration communications between nodes. Given the 3 dimensional
space the nodes traverse, we assume that the nodes are not constrained along a
defined vector, although aircraft frequently operate along designated routes and at
specified altitudes within the ATC system.

1

Passenger and military jet aircraft typically fly at altitudes between 30,000 – 45,000 feet at speeds
ranging from 450 – 500 mph. Turboprop aircraft normally operate at altitudes between 18,000 – 28,000
feet at speeds in the range 250 – 320 mph. Smaller general aviation aircraft are predominately powered
by reciprocating engines, usually operating at altitudes below 18,000 feet and at speeds below 230 mph.
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The network model is based on single-hop unidirectional broadcast links. Nodes
in the MANET use a concept called beaconing to broadcast their position, velocity and
direction in plaintext on recurring intervals of a few hundred milliseconds. We consider
the ADS-B communications network to be a long range network, since it is designed to
operate over wide coverage areas. The UHF frequencies utilized by the 1090 ES and
UAT implementation of ADS-B are both line-of-sight (LOS), and are designed to operate
at distances of 100 NM or more 2.
Although the ADS-B network has many similarities to wireless sensor networks,
we assume that ADS-B devices have no energy limitations when actively participating as
nodes in the network. Nodes that are equidistant from an ADS-B ground station are
assumed to have the same signal strength with respect to that ground station. In
addition, we assume that ADS-B ground station and aircraft avionics hardware have no
significant computational constraints associated with sending and receiving messages
on the network.
Another concern in some wireless sensor networks is the undetected physical
capture of legitimate network nodes [11]. Since the aviation industry would consider it
very undesirable to place any restrictions on ownership of general aviation aircraft,
controlling legal access to legitimate ADS-B nodes would prove to be difficult if not
impossible. As a result, the undetected physical capture of legitimate ADS-B nodes is a
relatively low priority in the hierarchy of ADS-B vulnerabilities.
2

Aviation distances are normally measured in nautical miles. One nautical mile is equivalent to 1.15078
statute miles.
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As a final topic in describing the properties of the ADS-B network, we consider
the overall network reliability. Throughout the development of the ADS-B system,
network reliability has not been an important concern. As a consequence, the ADS-B
protocol has no ability to mitigate collisions on the frequency channel. Due to the
broadcast nature of the network model, there are no provisions in the protocol for
handling lost packets. Although packet loss does not normally cause a problem for the
sending and receiving of broadcast messages, there is a substantial amount of packet
loss on the physical layer. According to [7] and [11], the mean packet error rate is 33%.
This means that approximately 1/3 of the ADS-B messages currently exceed the 5-bit
error correction limitation and this error rate will likely escalate as the ADS-B channel
utilization rate increases due to the expected growth in air traffic density over the next
several years.

Required Security Attributes
As discussed in the previous chapter, recent papers by Giannatto and Markowsky
[5] and McCallie et al. [8] present several case studies which highlight the need for
adding security to the ADS-B communications network broadcasts. In addition, work by
Costin and Francillon [1], Magazu [2] , and Schäfer et al. [6] demonstrate the ease with
which inexpensive and readily available hardware can exploit the vulnerabilities
inherent in the existing ADS-B implementation.
The system performance standards for ADS-B are outlined in the Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) documents DO-242A, DO-260B and DO-282B. None
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of these documents make any mention of security as a part of the requirements
specification. Therefore there was never any emphasis put on securing the protocol
during its initial development. We can, however, use the network model defined in the
previous section to identify the desired security attributes for potential ADS-B security
schemes. An ideal and comprehensive ADS-B security solution will have the following
qualities:
•

Compatibility – The security scheme is compatible with the current ADS-B
infrastructure and protocol, having minimal impact on current air traffic
management operations.

•

Scalability – The security solution is adaptable to increasing air traffic
density and can accommodate anticipated growth in traffic volume. This
implies that the solution must offer increased network reliability through
robustness to packet loss.

•

Resistance to Signal Jamming and DoS – The security solution will provide
protection against malicious narrow band and pulse signal jamming
attacks. The solution must also be secure against Denial of Service
attacks.

•

Data Integrity – The security scheme must provide assurance to the
receiver that the data received has not intercepted and modified in any
way by a third party.
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•

Source Integrity – The security approach must provide assurance to the
receiver that the data received originated from the sender claiming to
have sent the message.

•

Location Integrity – The security scheme must provide assurance to the
receiver that the message actually originated from the location claimed in
the message position data.

•

Responsiveness – Due to the very short communication timeframes in the
MANET, the security solution must quickly detect and respond to
incidents on the network.

Over the past few years there has been a growing body of work investigating
possible approaches to ADS-B security, with progress in related fields such as wireless
sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) providing researchers with
ideas for developing security schemes applicable to ADS-B. Using the security
requirements listed above as a guide, we will discuss and evaluate several current
proposals for enhancing ADS-B security.

ADS-B Security Solutions Taxonomy
As noted above, there has been a substantial amount of recent research into
providing ADS-B security, encompassing a variety of approaches. As shown in Figure 4,
the proposed ADS-B security solutions can be organized into a taxonomy which groups
the recent proposed security schemes into two separate and distinctive categories:
Secure Broadcast Authentication and Secure Location Verification.
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Figure 4. Taxonomy of ADS-B Security [7].

We categorize approaches to Secure Broadcast Authentication as those schemes
which provide the receiver with verification that messages received actually originated
from the claimed source and were not intercepted or modified en-route. These
approaches are further subcategorized as Cryptographic and Non-cryptographic
security schemes. In Chapter 5 we discuss both of these message integrity approaches.
Secure Location Verification schemes utilize a diverse group of noncryptographic techniques to help verify the location claimed by a sender. Sastry et al.
[12] distinguish between two different methods of secure location verification: InRegion Verification and Secure Location Determination. When a receiver employs inregion verification, various algorithms are used to analyze the available data and
attempt to verify the plausibility of the sender’s claimed location and intended vector.
The receiver then either accepts or rejects the claim based on the probability that the
sender is in the region claimed in the message.
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In contrast, the secure location determination method attempts to discover the
physical location of the sender as a means to cross-check the sender’s claimed location.
In this method, the receiver tries to compute the sender’s actual location in 3dimensional space and compare it to the location claimed in the message. In Chapter 6
we discuss secure location verification approaches of both the in-region verification and
secure location determination types.
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CHAPTER 5
SECURE BROADCAST AUTHENTICATION SOLUTIONS

In our description of the ADS-B network model, we noted that communications
between nodes on the network are unidirectional broadcasts. Due to this broadcast
architecture, potential security mechanisms must preserve the open nature of ADS-B so
as not to restrict or encumber communications on the network. The lack of support for
reliable data transfer and two-way communication between nodes in ADS-B makes
message authentication more challenging than in a point-to-point communications
network.
Security solutions in the Secure Broadcast Authentication category have been
studied as a means for authenticating unidirectional broadcast messages. Recent work
in securing MANETs and wireless sensor networks discuss both cryptographic and noncryptographic solutions, and in the following sections we analyze their feasibility for
providing security to the ADS-B communications system.
Cryptographic approaches include both symmetric and asymmetric mechanisms
for message authentication 3. Secure broadcast authentication schemes can be
implemented either as a global mechanism on the network or designed so as to
selectively respond to threats detected on the network. Such reactive authentication
3

Symmetric-key algorithms utilize the same cryptographic keys for both encryption of plaintext and
decryption of ciphertext, while asymmetric-key cryptographic algorithms require both a private and a
public key.

26

could prove useful in reducing interference on the network by only requiring additional
security at times when incidents seem more likely, minimizing additional computational
and communicational overhead [7]. Non-cryptographic schemes focus on the physical
layer, identifying solutions based on recognizing unique hardware or software
characteristics of nodes on the network. In the following sections we discuss potential
cryptographic and non-cryptographic security schemes.

Cryptographic Schemes
Cryptographic security schemes in wireless networks are an established means
to secure communication that offer possible application to ADS-B. However, the open
nature of the ADS-B architecture presents unique security challenges for cryptographic
schemes, with a primary issue being the development of a suitable key distribution
infrastructure.
Robinson et al. [13] describe the advantages and disadvantages to ad hoc and
structured key distribution arrangements. An ad hoc approach to key distribution
utilizes the preloading of trusted certificates into a node prior to the node joining the
network. The trusted certificates would contain collections of public keys, and could be
self-signed, signed by a local certificate authority (CA) or obtained from a third party
distributor [13]. The validity of the certificates themselves cannot be verified by the
node and must therefore be preloaded via a trusted mechanism. The principle
advantage of ad hoc key distribution is its simplicity on relatively small networks.
Having a limited number of certificates and corresponding private keys reduces the
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probability of having a compromised key or an invalid certificate, assuming that a
private key is not shared among multiple entities. The primary drawback to the ad hoc
key distribution approach is that it does not scale well, since certificate management
becomes much more challenging as the size of the network grows and the node density
increases. Due to the lack of scalability of ad hoc key distribution arrangements, we will
focus on cryptographic approaches that utilize structured key distribution.
Whether the cryptographic approach is symmetric or asymmetric, security
techniques suitable for wireless sensor networks and MANETs cannot be simply
retrofitted into the existing ADS-B communications system. This is due to several
difficulties that the ADS-B network presents. For one, the ADS-B network is limited by
the available UHF bandwidth on the 968 and 1090 MHz frequency channels and there
are currently no plans for increasing the spectrum allocations. This creates an additional
problem in that the number of nodes that the ADS-B system can support is limited by
interference on the designated ADS-B frequency channels. Security solutions that
extend the message length will result in increased interference and reduced operational
capacity [9]. Also, any potential cryptographic schemes must be deployed globally, and
therefore must be implemented jointly between several international aviation agencies.
Symmetric-key encryption utilizes algorithms to transform messages from
plaintext to cyphertext and back using a secret cryptographic key shared by the sender
and receiver. The encryption algorithms are designed to produce cyphertext that is
computationally infeasible to decipher without the shared secret key. However, a
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compact encryption scheme must be employed so as not create additional frequency
congestion and interference problems.
One potential compact encryption solution is Format Preserving Encryption
(FPE). FPE is a symmetric-key encryption algorithm that creates a cyphertext that is the
same length as the original plaintext message, which means the encrypted messages
would not add any additional communications load on the ADS-B channel. An
alternative compact symmetric-key encryption solution for minimizing additional
congestion on the ADS-B channel is to utilize a standard encryption algorithm in output
feedback mode 4 with a block size that fits within the ADS-B message length restriction.
The primary drawback to symmetric-key encryption approaches to ADS-B is the
problem of key management. In order for the ADS-B unidirectional broadcasts to be
received and deciphered, all nodes on the network need access to the secret key. The
problem is that anyone with knowledge of the secret shared key can generate valid
messages, so a single secret key leak will compromise the entire security system. Since
the ADS-B network environment is inherently untrustworthy and the open nature of the
network requires all nodes to have access to the secret key, symmetric-key encryption
schemes are an impractical approach to securing the current ADS-B implementation.

4

Output feedback (OFB) is a mode of operation for a block cipher that permits encryption of differing
block sizes, but the output of the encryption block function is the feedback (instead of the ciphertext). The
XOR value of each plaintext block is created independently of both the plaintext and ciphertext.
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Public Key Infrastructure
A structured key distribution solution called a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a
scalable approach to cryptographic key management. PKI makes use of an asymmetrickey encryption scheme, where each node on the network has a public-private key pair
bound to a unique identity by a certificate authority. While less computationally
efficient than symmetric-key encryption, asymmetric-key techniques have the
advantage that a node cannot forge a message on the network. The unique publicprivate key pair guarantees that only nodes whose identities have been verified by the
CA can communicate over the network. This means that if a node’s private key is
compromised, the CA need only revoke a single key pair, as the key pairs of all the other
network nodes remain valid. In an asymmetric-key encryption scheme, nodes encrypt
message with the intended recipient’s public key using a standard asymmetric
encryption algorithm. The receiving node then decrypts the message with its private
key. Data integrity is ensured since only the sender’s intended recipient can decrypt the
message.
When considered as a security solution for ADS-B, asymmetric-key encryption
has two major drawbacks. The first issue is that current asymmetric-key schemes have
no compact encryption implementations, and would result in an increase of the
transmitted ADS-B message length. The second problem is that unique encrypted ADS-B
messages would be required for each recipient. To maintain a fully-connected network
of n nodes would necessitate (n2 − n) unique broadcasts rather than n in the current
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system [9], which obviously does not scale well as the size of the network increases.
As a possible answer to these two drawbacks, Costin et al. [1] have suggested
what they term a “lightweight” PKI solution. In the lightweight PKI approach, node A
transmits its digital signature 5 over n messages, so that after every n messages, the
surrounding nodes have received A’s digital signature. The recipients keep the
messages until the entire digital signature has been transmitted and they can
authenticate the buffered messages. The authors suggest that the PKI key distribution
necessary for this scheme could be done during an aircraft’s scheduled maintenance
cycle [7].
As described by Zhang et al. [14] and outlined in [7], there are several obstacles
in applying a full cryptographic solution to ADS-B that cannot be easily resolved. First,
the open nature of ADS-B is widely seen as a desirable feature of the network. A
cryptographic system intentionally obstructs public broadcast communication. Second,
key exchange is notoriously difficult in ad hoc networks, which are by definition without
a centralized institution. The dynamic nature of the network results in too much
overhead in both the number and the size of messages. Third, any encryption scheme
will immediately break compatibility with the existing infrastructure. For these reasons,
it appears that a traditional, fully-cryptographic approach to securing ADS-B is not
feasible.

5

Digital signature algorithms take a message and a sender’s private key as input and return a digital
signature unique to the input. Upon receipt of a message-signature pair, the receiver can apply a
verification algorithm to authenticate the signed message using the sender’s public key.
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Retroactive Key Publication
A security scheme called Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication
(TESLA) is a variation on traditional asymmetric cryptography that has been proposed
for use on broadcast networks [15], [16]. With TESLA, senders retroactively publish
their keys which are then used by receivers to authenticate the broadcast messages. A
broadcasting node produces an encrypted message authentication code (MAC) which is
included with every message. After a designated time interval or number of messages,
the key to decrypt the sender’s MAC is published. Listening receivers who have
buffered the sender’s previous messages can then decrypt the messages that were
broadcast. When applied to ADS-B, this technique imposes a time delay on the
broadcast due to the need to buffer messages, but it provides integrity and continuity of
messages sent over the network.
The TESLA protocol is loss-tolerant and scalable, capable of providing efficient
broadcast authentication over networks consisting of a large number of nodes. μTESLA
is an adaption of the TESLA protocol designed for use on wireless sensor networks. The
μTESLA protocol requires nodes in the network to be loosely time synchronized, with
each node having an upper bound on the maximum clock synchronization error.
According to Perrig et al. [17], the μTESLA adaptation addresses several inadequacies of
TELSA in wireless sensor networks:
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•

TESLA uses digital signatures for initial packet authentication, which are
too computationally expensive for use in sensor nodes. The μTESLA
protocol utilizes symmetric-key mechanisms.

•

TESLA discloses a key with each message, generating too many messages
on the network. In contrast, μTESLA releases the key once per time
interval.

•

TELSA stores one-way key chains for all nodes, which is expensive. The
μTESLA protocol restricts the number of authenticated nodes.

As discussed earlier, asymmetric encryption schemes have high computation and
communication overhead, which limit their usefulness as security approaches on the
bandwidth-constrained ADS-B network. The μTESLA protocol overcomes this problem
by employing asymmetric-key encryption through a delayed disclosure of symmetric
keys, which results in an efficient broadcast authentication scheme. When one
considers the bandwidth and interference limitations on the ADS-B frequency channel,
the μTESLA design adaptations identify this protocol as a viable scheme for providing
security in ADS-B.
To send an authenticated message, a sender computes a MAC on the message
using a key that is secret at that point in time. When a recipient gets a message it uses
its loosely synchronized clock, a upper bound on clock synchronization error and the
time schedule at which keys are disclosed to verify that the corresponding verification
key has not yet been disclosed by the sender. If the receiver determines that the key for
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the message has not yet been disclosed, it is buffered for future authentication. At the
scheduled time of key disclosure, the sending node broadcasts the verification key to all
receivers. Once a recipient gets the disclosed key from the sender, it can readily verify
the correctness of the key and authenticate the message stored in its buffer.
μTESLA use one-way key chains that are developed from the MAC included in the
messages. Each MAC is used to generate a key in the key chain with a one-way
function 𝐹. In order to generate the one-way key chain, a sender randomly chooses the

last key 𝐾𝑛 and repeatedly applies the function 𝐹 to compute all the other keys:

𝐾𝑖 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖+1 ), where 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. This means that every secret key 𝐾𝑖 , where 𝑖 > 0

is used for sending in the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ interval and disclosed to the network after a scheduled

time period 𝑡. Instead of adding a disclosed key to each data packet, the key disclosure
is independent from the broadcast messages, and is tied to time intervals.

Part of the attractiveness of μTESLA is its ability to tolerate lost messages, and
Figure 5 shows an example of how μTESLA copes with packet loss on the network. Each
key 𝐾𝑖 of the key chain corresponds to a time interval 𝑡𝑖 , with all messages sent within
time interval 𝑡𝑖 authenticated with key 𝐾𝑖 . In this example, the scheduled disclosure

time period is 2. The example assumes that the receiving node is loosely time

synchronized and that key 𝐾0 has been previously authenticated on the network.
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Figure 5. Example of μTESLA time-released key chain for source authentication [17].

In interval 𝑡1 messages 𝑀1 and 𝑀2 are sent and contain a MAC created with

key 𝐾1. Message 𝑀3 is sent in interval 𝑡2 and contains a MAC generated using key 𝐾2 .

At this point, the recipient cannot authenticate any of the buffered messages, as key 𝐾1
has not yet been disclosed by the sender. Continuing with the example, assume that in
interval 𝑡3 messages 𝑀4 and 𝑀5 are lost. Further, let us assume that message 𝑀6

disclosing key 𝐾1 is also lost, so that the recipient is still unable to authenticate 𝑀1 ,

𝑀2 or 𝑀3 . In interval 𝑡4 the sender broadcasts key 𝐾2 , which the receiving node
authenticates by verifying 𝐾0 = 𝐹�𝐹(𝐾2) �, and can determine the missing key

since 𝐾1 = 𝐹(𝐾2 ). Using the disclosed keys, the recipient can authenticate messages
𝑀1 and 𝑀2 with 𝐾1 , and 𝑀3 with 𝐾2 [17].

The μTESLA protocol is attractive as a security solution for ADS-B because it

preserves the open nature of the broadcast network while avoiding a complex PKI
infrastructure to ensure a sender’s continuity. However, there are two obstacles to
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applying μTESLA to ADS-B. The primary issue is that, while sufficiently good time
synchronization could be provided via GPS, it would require modification to the protocol
to accommodate the GPS timestamp field. The second problem is that in order for
μTESLA to be used for verifying the identity of a network node, it needs to be
reinitialized which leaves it susceptible to memory- based DoS attacks. In spite of these
drawbacks, μTESLA is a promising security scheme for integrating into ADS-B.
Aircraft Address Message Authentication Code
The cryptographic solutions PKI and μTESLA both have shortcomings in that they
require modifications to the current ADS-B protocol. In this section, we discuss a partial
ADS-B security solution that focuses on establishing message source integrity rather
than ensuring data integrity. The purpose here is to demonstrate a compatible security
scheme that will mitigate threats posed by message injection and modification attacks,
which are among the most critical vulnerabilities in the current ADS-B implementation.
The Aircraft Address Message Authentication Code (AA-MAC) security solution
utilizes a standard hash algorithm such as MD5 or SHA and a secret authentication key
to perform message integrity. The AA-MAC message source integrity scheme would
require a slight modification to the existing protocol in that it would replace the current
Aircraft Address (AA) field with the MAC, but the ADS-B message is otherwise
unchanged, as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. ADS-B message 24-bit PI field replaced by 24-bit MAC.
In the current ADS-B protocol, each aircraft is assigned a unique 24-bit Aircraft
Address that is good for the life of the transponder equipment. The AA-MAC approach
proposes a different aircraft identification strategy, assigning a unique identifier to each
aircraft that is good for the duration of a particular flight. As with PKI cryptographic
approaches, the distribution of the secret key presents challenges for AA-MAC. Several
secret key distribution strategies have been proposed for PKI, such as distributing keys
to all aircraft enclosed in tamper-proof hardware, utilizing an out-of-channel solution
such as a separate dedicated frequency or distributing keys on a per-flight basis. Since
MAC requires just one key which is used to uniquely identify a sender on the network,
the simplest approach would be to distribute the secret key only when an aircraft
intends to enter the air traffic control system and ADS-B network.
Every aircraft in the ATC en-route structure needs to file a flight plan prior to
flight. The flight plan includes information about the equipment capabilities of the
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aircraft, its intended route of flight, the expected duration of flight, the amount of fuel
on board and other details that ATC needs to know for contingency planning. The flight
crew could generate a secret key as part of their normal preflight procedure, and simply
pass that key along to ATC with their flight plan. This would allow the secret keys to be
continually updated, with a compromised key having minimal impact on the overall
system.
A complication with this approach is that most common hash algorithms
generate message authentication codes of 128-bits or more, which means the
generated MAC itself is longer than the entire 112-bit 1090ES message. The generated
hash needs to be shortened in order to meet the size limitation of the existing protocol.
To accomplish this, a sender could compute the MAC using the secret authentication
key, and then sequentially XOR the hash in 24-bit blocks (using 0 for padding) to
produce a 24-bit MAC. This would then be inserted into the ADS-B message, using the
24-bit space allocated to the AA field.
This proposal has the potential to offer source integrity to ADS-B by establishing
the identity of the sender; however there are several issues with this scheme that need
to be addressed. One area of concern is the amount of source integrity afforded using a
message authentication code of just 24-bits, yielding approximately 16.8 million
different possible codes. Given that the ADS-B message it being broadcast in plaintext,
the 24-bit size does not present a formidable computational challenge in forging the
secret key. However, due to the mobility and speed of the nodes, the short duration
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communications on the ADS-B network make the task of determining the secret key and
forging messages far more difficult for an attacker than in a static a point-to-point
network.
Additionally, since most hash functions produce MAC lengths of 128-bits or
longer, the shortened MAC length increases the potential for collisions between
duplicate MACs calculated for distinctly different messages. Appendix A contains a test
program and supporting functions that were used to test for possible message
collisions, where distinctly different messages hash to the same MAC. In the test, we
randomly altered bits in an ADS-B message, and then computed a 24-bit MAC for both
the original an altered messages using an MD5 hash function. The hashes were then
reduced to 24-bit MACs and compared. In 10 different tests of 100 million iterations
each, there were no collisions of duplicate MACs detected. While certainly not a
comprehensive test it demonstrates that even with just a 24-bit hash, duplicate MACs
will be a very rare occurrence.
The AA-MAC approach as we have described is limited to providing source
integrity for air-to-ground communications. The system does not have a mechanism for
establishing source integrity between aircraft. Combining AA-MAC with secure location
verification approaches we discuss in Chapter 6 may offer a more comprehensive
security scheme.
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While AA-MAC does not provide data integrity, it is highly compatible with the existing
1090ES protocol and can be implemented at low cost relative to other security
proposals, offering a feasible partial security solution for ADS-B.

Non-Cryptographic Schemes
As we have seen, cryptographic security schemes are difficult to implement in a
way that is compatible with the existing infrastructure, primarily due to the problem of
key distribution and management. Non-cryptographic approaches to network security
avoid the challenge of key management and instead involve either some form of
fingerprinting on the physical layer, or a frequency modulation scheme such as spread
spectrum.
Physical Layer
Schemes such as fingerprinting encompass various methods for authentication
and identification, either based on hardware or software imperfections or
characteristics of the frequency channel which are hard to replicate. Regardless of the
method employed, the goal is to detect and respond to suspicious activity in a network.
Identifying signatures for legitimate nodes on the network provides data useful for the
implementation of systems to detect network intrusions.
Software-Based Fingerprinting schemes attempt to isolate distinct characteristics
of the software operating on network equipment. The development teams for different
network equipment manufacturers often take widely varied paths when implementing
software on a given device. These differences can be cataloged and later exploited to
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tell apart dissimilar network devices, and can be used to verify their continuity up to a
certain degree [7].
Hardware-Based Fingerprinting approaches seek to identify and catalog unique
network hardware differences. Some of these differences can be used for radiometric
fingerprinting, which takes advantage of differences in the modulation of a radio signal
to catalog unique device signatures. Clock skew is another identifiable hardware
feature that can be used to establish uniqueness between wireless devices. Since no
two clocks are perfectly synchronized, time difference can be used to create signatures
and enable identification.
The biggest obstacle to hardware or software fingerprinting in ADS-B is the
difficultly in putting together a meaningful catalog for a fleet of similar aircraft.
Commercial and military aviation fleets typically consist of hundreds of aircraft fitted
with very similar or identical hardware, making them nearly impossible to differentiate.
The similarity between fleet aircraft has the additional impediment that they are easier
for a potential attacker to study and copy [7]. Hardware solutions such as clock skew
are difficult to utilize in the current protocol as they would require timestamps included
in ADS-B messages. Also, it is possible for an attacker to eavesdrop on the
communication and mimic the appropriate clock skew.
A third category of fingerprinting is Channel/Location-Based Fingerprinting. This
fingerprinting method tries to exploit natural characteristics of the communications
channel. Various approaches utilizing received signal strength (RSS), channel impulse
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response (CIR) and the carrier phase have shown that this can be a viable alternative to
more traditional authentication and verification measures. They can be implemented
relatively easily in wireless systems and can offer reasonable security without adding
excessive overhead [7]. The drawback to Channel/Location-Based Fingerprinting is that
it requires two-way communication, and thus is not compatible with the current ADS-B
communications system.
Spread Spectrum
Another non-cryptographic solution used in securing RF communications is a
method called spread spectrum. The technology is used in applications that require
resistance to signal jamming and as a means of protecting wireless communications
from passive listening. Spread spectrum methods have also proved beneficial as an aid
in expanding the utilization of the available radio spectrum.
There are two approaches to spread spectrum frequency modulation: Frequency
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS). DSSS
has the advantage of providing higher bandwidth capacity than FHSS, but it is a very
sensitive to environmental factors. FHSS is a more robust technology than DSSS, with
little susceptibility to interference. In addition, FHSS can accommodate a significantly
higher number of simultaneously active systems in the same geographic region than
DSSS systems. These characteristics make the FHSS technology much better suited to
the ADS-B network.
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Spread Spectrum utilizes a key (also called the code or sequence) attached to the
communication channel. The way in which the code is attached to the communication
channel expands the signal bandwidth by several orders of magnitude and determines
whether the spread‐spectrum technique is Frequency Hopping or Direct Sequence. The
baseband signal is intentionally spread over a larger bandwidth by injecting a higher
frequency signal. As a result, energy used in transmitting the signal is spread over a
wider bandwidth, and appears as noise. The ratio (in dB) between the spread baseband
and the original signal is called processing gain, with typical spread spectrum processing
gains ranging from 10dB to 60dB [18].
When spread spectrum is applied to the communications channel the effect is to
diffuse the information into a larger bandwidth. This diffusion process is what provides
security and protects the channel from jamming and eavesdropping attacks. The
receiving node can remove the spread‐spectrum code in a process called de-spreading.
The de-spreading operation reconstitutes the information into its original bandwidth so
that the data can be retrieved.
There are two primary drawbacks to applying spread spectrum to the ADS-B
channel. The first is that the spreading code must be known in advance at both ends of
the transmission channel, and thus spread spectrum has the same key distribution and
management issues that encumber cryptographic techniques. The second issue for
ADS-B is that spread spectrum is incompatible with the current ADS-B infrastructure,
requiring substantial changes that would be costly to implement.
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Due to the need for extensive infrastructure modifications, non-cryptographic
security schemes such as channel/location-based fingerprinting and spread spectrum
are not feasible security solutions for the current ADS-B infrastructure. However,
channel/location-based fingerprinting does provide a non-cryptographic means of
authentication while spread spectrum offers protection against signal jamming attacks.
Based on these desirable attributes, development of a post-NextGen ATC system should
explore ways to incorporate these non-cryptographic security solutions.
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CHAPTER 6
SECURE LOCATION VERIFICATION SOLUTIONS

As an alternative to securing the communication channel of ADS-B, the concept
of Secure Location Verification is to substantiate the authenticity of location claims
made by ADS-B network participants. This approach is inherently different from
establishing the integrity of broadcast sources and messages. As described in [12], InRegion Verification and Secure Location Determination are two different methods of
location verification, but the underlying principle of both is to confirm a node’s position
within the network. The goal of secure location verification schemes is to provide a
means of cross-checking location claims made by network participants. Since secure
location verification creates supplementary position data, these approaches have the
additional advantage of offering redundancy to the current system. This additional data
can be merged with ADS- B and radar information, providing a fallback system in case of
failure of the primary surveillance system [7].

In-Region Verification
There is a distinction between secure source location verification methods that
attempt to precisely identify the location of a network participant, and those that
attempt to determine the plausibility that a sender is in the region claimed in a
message. In-Region Verification schemes attempt to do the latter, employing
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algorithms that utilize estimation methods to determine the probability that a sender’s
claim is true. We discuss Distance Bounding and Kalman Filtering as two possible InRegion Verification solutions with potential application to ADS-B.
Distance Bounding
Distance bounding is a location verification method employed in wireless
networks to localize other network nodes. The basis of distance bounding protocols is
built on the fact that electromagnetic waves travel at roughly the speed of light, but
never faster. The concept behind distance bounding is to provide a means wherein a
location claimed by prover P is challenged by a verifier V to demonstrate that P is within
a certain physical distance of V, as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Principle of distance bounding protocols [7].
The verifier V sends a challenge message indicated by the dashed black arrows in
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Figure 7 to the prover P who then, after processing the challenge message, sends its
response. As indicated by the alternating solid and double-dash arrows in the figure, a
man in the middle (V’/P’) can only increase the apparent distance by adding further
processing delay. This enables V to compute a distance based on the time between the
V’s challenge and the corresponding response by P. The distance computed by V serves
as an upper-distance bound between V and P, and can be used to check the truth of P’s
claimed location. When applied to the air traffic surveillance model, the distancebounding results of multiple ground stations can be combined to establish the
probability that a sender is actually in the region claimed in its message.
There are several potential challenges to implementing distance bounding into
ADS-B. The first issue is that distance bounding schemes have been used primarily for
close-range indoor wireless communications, and have not been successfully tested over
the long distances and with the high node velocities present in the air traffic control
system. Another issue is that there are various practical attacks on distance bounding
schemes given in the literature, among them a number of relay attacks and distance
hijacking attacks, so further research into mitigating the effectiveness of the these
threats is required. Perhaps the most problematic issue facing distance bounding
schemes is the fact that it requires a challenge-response protocol, which renders them
incompatible with the current ADS-B implementation.
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Kalman Filtering for Intent Verification
Kalman filtering is a technique used to filter observations from a noisy data
series by providing estimates for the future state of values in the underlying system.
The theory behind Kalman filtering requires the observed system to be a linear data
series and the underlying input variables to follow a normal distribution. The algorithm
is recursive and can efficiently update its estimation values in real time, without having
to save more than the last system state. The Kalman filtering procedure comprises
three distinct steps; prediction, observation and update. In the first step, the current
system state variables are predicted along with a probability estimate of associated
uncertainties. The predicted system state values are based on an estimation of the
current system state, observations of the state transitions in the system and known
system input control variables. The predicted uncertainties are probability estimations
based on observations of the state transitions in the system, a system data covariance
estimate and an estimate of system process error.
In the observation step, the system adjusts its estimation values by measuring
the residual, which is the discrepancy between the predicted values from the previous
step and the currently observed system state values. The observed system values are
also used to calculate a residual covariance, based on the probabilities from the
previous step and an estimate of system observation measurement error. Finally, the
previously obtained estimates are updated with a weighted average, and the estimates
with higher probabilities are assigned higher weights.
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This continuous process of prediction, observation and update is a form of
feedback control, where the filter estimates the process state at a point in time, and
then obtains feedback in the form of noisy measurements. The update step provides
the feedback, which incorporates the new observation into the existing estimate to
obtain an improved estimate [19]. Thus, a system employing Kalman filtering is
constantly updating itself with the most recent observations and revising the values
used to compute its estimates.
Figure 8 shows an example of a Kalman filter applied to a single-variable system.
The figure was generated using a linear Kalman filter implemented in Python, which is
listed in Appendix B.

Figure 8. Single-variable Kalman filtering example.
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In the example, the noisy values are randomly generated from a Gaussian distribution
with a mean of 1.25 and standard deviation of 0.25. The figure provides a
demonstration of the estimation refinement process that takes place in the feedback
control loop. As the figure shows, the Kalman filter quickly develops an estimate of the
actual value. The estimation values provided by the Kalman filter continually improve in
accuracy, so that by 30 milliseconds, it has a very close estimation of the actual value of
1.25 and it maintains a reasonably precise estimation through the remainder of the time
period. When employed as means of intent verification in the air traffic management
system, a multi-variable Kalman filter would be utilized, but the underlying estimation
refinement process for each input variable would be the same as shown in the singlevariable example.
Kalman filtering is currently used in airport ground control systems to help
prevent runway incursion incidents and minimize bottlenecks on airport taxiways. This
is accomplished by filtering and verifying data reported by aircraft equipped with ADS-B
and conducting plausibility checks on these observations. Krozel et al. [20] propose a
multi-variable Kalman filtering solution that can be used to verify the intent of an
aircraft by identifying correlation functions that can in turn be used to evaluate
relationships between actual aircraft motions and the intended vector information sent
in the ADS-B message. The proposal uses data obtained from ATC controller directives
regarding heading and altitude to determine the target’s geometric conformance. The
system then evaluates the actual aircraft heading and altitude and compares it to the

50

target’s broadcast intentions to determine intent conformance. The two conformances
are then analyzed to develop a plausible intent model in terms of the estimated
horizontal and vertical paths, as well as the anticipated velocity of the target.
Kalman filtering has two principal weaknesses that leave it vulnerable to possible
exploitation. One is that Kalman filters can be tricked by what is termed a frog boiling
attack. In this exploit, an adversary jams the message transmission legitimate of a
legitimate node while continuously transmitting a slightly modified bogus position
message. If the adversary transmits the false data slowly enough, the Kalman filter will
see this injected data as a valid trajectory change. A second potential weakness of the
scheme is that it opens up more DoS attack possibilities, since the Kalman filtering
process requires increased computational complexity at every node in the network [7].
In spite of these weaknesses, Kalman filtering is very compatible with the existing ADS-B
infrastructure, offering a highly scalable and relatively low cost means of adding security
to the current ADS-B communications system.

Secure Location Determination
In contrast to In-Region Verification schemes which attempt to determine the
plausibility of a sender’s claimed location, the general principle behind Secure Location
Determination is to identify the precise position of a node on the network as a crosscheck of the location claimed by the sender. Because Secure Location Determination
solutions are used to verify a sender’s actual location, they are redundant surveillance
systems and require an infrastructure that is independent of the ADS-B communications
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system. We will discuss two potential Secure Location Determination approaches for
ADS-B, Multilateration and Data Fusion.
Multilateration
Multilateration (MLAT) is a low-cost location determination technology that is
used for airport surface movement as well as for terminal and en route traffic
surveillance. MLAT provides excellent performance under a variety of conditions, and is
especially useful in providing surveillance in remote geographic areas due to its less
frequent maintenance requirements than radar systems. MLAT is a completely
independent surveillance system, and unlike ADS-B, does not require any change or
modification to existing aircraft avionics or communications systems.
A multilateration system is based on the time difference of arrival (TDOA)
principle. The system requires multiple antennas in separate locations that receive the
same signal, but at different times due to TDOA. A typical system consists of four or
more target tracking antennas and a target processing unit as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Basic MLAT architecture [7].
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The target processing unit calculates a target’s position based on the TDOA of
the signal as measured at the tracking antennas. Since the target processing unit knows
the exact location of each tracking antenna, the measured TDOA at two receivers can be
used to form a hyperboloid in the region where the target is located. When the TDOA of
four or more receiving stations are combined, the result is the intersection of three or
more hyperboloids. This intersection allows the target processing unit to identify the
target’s position in 3-dimensional space, as shown by the red point in Figure 10.

Figure 10. Intersection of Three TDOA Hyperboloids [21].
MLAT is currently used as a ground surveillance technology at various airports,
but there have been recent studies of Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) for application
in airborne MANETs. Recent work with WAM has shown that it is possible to obtain
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roughly ±30 meter accuracy at a distance of 90 NM from the central station. This
compares favorably with the ±20 meter accuracy obtained from ADS-B via its GPS data.
WAM offers target position accuracy comparable to ADS-B at distance up to 100 NM,
but beyond that distance WAM precision begins to degrade rapidly [7].
In order to achieve sufficient system accuracy, individual tracking antennas in a
purely hyperbolic system should be as far apart as possible. However, coverage volume
and geographic considerations do not always allow for optimum ground station
placement. To solve this problem, Xu et al. [21] discuss an elliptic-hyperbolic MLAT
system that has been the subject of recent research. In this system, an ellipsoid is
created by a sender and a receiver, using the known total time between a Mode S
interrogation and its reply. The ellipse is formed from the reply time sum of arrivals
(TSOA) as shown in Figure 11, and tends to intercept the juncture of the MLAT
hyperboloids.

Figure 11. Construction of TSOA Ellipse [21].
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A weakness of purely hyperbolic MLAT systems is their lack of precision in
estimating target altitude. The system is capable of providing precise 2-dimensional
latitude and longitude estimates, but has difficulty in accurately determining target
altitude with its ground-based antenna due to the angle of intersection between the
hyperbolas. The elliptical-hyperbolic MLAT implementation significantly reduces
altitude estimation errors and can yield more accurate 3-dimensional position estimates
than purely hyperbolic MLAT systems.
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In spite of the performance potential and low cost of the system, there are some
unsolved problems to applying MLAT as a secure location determination solution. The
first issue is that the system is susceptible to RF interference phenomena which result in
multipath propagation, where the signal reaches the antenna via different paths. This
can distort the TDOA information resulting in an erroneous calculation of target
position.
Another technical issue affecting MLAT is the requirement for the target signal to
be correctly detected at multiple receiving stations in order for the target processing
unit to determine an accurate position. The large number of required ground stations
increases the probability of an equipment failure in the system, which would degrade
the central station’s ability to provide accurate target position estimates. As a final
point, WAM systems may have difficulty scaling to meet increasing air traffic density.
Since MLAT relies on multiple ground-based antennas, the current WAM
implementation proposals may reach system capacity in certain regions where
geographic characteristics prevent the installation of additional tracking antennas.
Data Fusion
Data fusion is a recognized method for aggregating data from different sources,
with the goal of producing information that is more valuable to the end user than the
original individual data sets. Data fusion is a multilayered process that uses associations
and correlations in data from multiple sources to create estimates which are combined
into a single data set. The concept can be employed using a variety of approaches
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including statistical analysis, probabilistic modelling, fuzzy logic and machine learning.
The type of data fusion approach used depends on the requirements of the application,
the type of data being analyzed and the desired reliability of the result [22].
When considered as an ADS-B security scheme, the literature proposes the use
of estimation algorithms to check positional data obtained from within the ADS-B
communications network against data coming in from independent surveillance sources
such as PSR, SSR and MLAT (see Figure 12).

Figure 12. ADS-B/SSR Fusion Model [23].
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These estimation and verification methods can provide a means of error and
threat detection, by determining if some of the involved system data is outside normal
parameters. This allows automated procedures to be developed which would permit
quick problem identification and reaction within the air traffic management system. The
central concept to utilizing data fusion as a secure location verification paradigm is
establishing the trustworthiness of the data, thus determining if it has been subject to
error or malicious modification. The data trust-worthiness can be calculated by
analyzing the data associations and correlations using fusion algorithms, which aim to
expose anomalies in received information and thus to enable the automated detection
of threats to the system [7].
Yong et al. [23] discuss some challenges facing the data fusion of ADS-B and
radar surveillance information. One issue is that the two surveillance approaches utilize
different coordinate systems. Since ADS-B position data is derived from GPS, it uses the
WGS-84 coordinate system, while PSR and SSR use polar coordinates. The authors
suggest the positional data be transformed to Cartesian coordinates. Another
complication is that the system needs to be able to handle time calibration differences
between the information sources. The data provided by ADS-B is obtained nonsynchronously with the radar or MLAT data it is being compared against. Therefore, a
time bias needs be calibrated prior to applying the data fusion algorithm.
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Since many of the required components for data fusion are already contained
within the existing surveillance infrastructure, integrating it as a secure location
verification solution is relatively straightforward. The advantages of extending data
fusion techniques to secure location verification with ADS-B are its compatibility with
legacy systems and the fact that the ADS-B protocol is not affected by data fusion
security schemes. The obvious drawback is the increased cost due to the requirement
for multiple independent surveillance information sources.
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CHAPTER 7
ANALYSIS OF SECURITY SOLUTIONS

After reviewing potential approaches to secure broadcast authentication and
secure location verification, it is clear that there is no single optimal solution to securing
ADS-B communications. Limitations in the existing ADS-B protocol, congestion on the
1090 MHz channel and the need for compatibility with existing communications
hardware present challenges to finding viable security solutions and render many
proposals impractical.

Cost-Effective Solutions
A concern that is notably absent in the recent literature on ADS-B security
solutions is the substantial cost to the aviation industry of installing the required
avionics equipment to support the ADS-B surveillance system. Every military,
commercial and general aviation aircraft operating in the ATC system will require
additional avionics equipment or modifications to existing equipment in order to
support ADS-B communications. In addition, pilots and air traffic controllers need to be
trained on the new equipment. According to the airline industry, ADS-B equipment
could cost airlines, including regional carriers, as much as 5 billion dollars [24] in order to
meet the FAA mandated implementation deadline of January, 2020. The price tag for
modifying the military and general aviation aircraft fleet is equally as staggering. It is
unreasonable to expect the airline industry, the DoD and private aircraft owners to
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invest billions of dollars in new avionics equipment only to have that equipment
rendered obsolete by modifications to the ADS-B system to support additional security.
Therefore, any security measures employed in the ADS-B system must take cost
and compatibility with the existing hardware and protocol into account. In our analysis
of security solutions, we place a high degree of emphasis on compatibility of the various
proposals with the current ADS-B implementation. Strohmeier et al. [7], develop an
interesting tabular comparison of the capabilities, security features and feasibilities of
various security approaches for use with ADS-B. We expand on the tabular comparison
in [7] to create a ranking system for evaluating the most cost-effective and feasible
solutions out of those currently being studied.
Evaluation of Scheme Implementation Considerations
Using the security scheme characteristics described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6,
we evaluate the various security approaches using three categories; implementation
complexity, type of security provided and message integrity features provided. In Table
2, we evaluate the following security scheme properties:
•

Difficulty - The overall complexity of implementing the approach. We categorize
the scheme difficulty as follows:
o High - Schemes that require regulatory changes such as the need for
additional frequency bandwidth or major infrastructure modifications are
considered difficult to implement. Schemes with High difficulty are
assigned 0 points in our ranking system.
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o Moderate – Schemes that require at least some changes to the existing
infrastructure or modifications to the protocol are considered moderately
difficult to implement. Schemes with Moderate difficulty are assigned 0.5
points in our ranking system.
o Low - Schemes that require no changes to infrastructure or protocol are
considered to have a low implementation difficulty. Schemes with Low
difficulty are assigned 1 point in our ranking system.
•

Cost - The projected cost of required hardware and software changes. We
categorize a schemes cost as follows:
o High - Proposals that require new avionics and ground station hardware
or major software design changes are considered costly. Schemes with
High cost are assigned 0 points in our ranking system.
o Moderate – Schemes that require minor hardware and/or software are
considered moderately costly to implement. Schemes with Moderate
cost are assigned 0.5 points in our ranking system.
o Low - Schemes that require minimal changes to hardware or software are
considered to have a low implementation cost. Schemes with Low cost
are assigned 1 point in our ranking system.

•

Scalability - Considers how well the proposed scheme can adapt to rising air
traffic density. We categorize a schemes scalability as follows:
o High - Highly accommodative schemes are considered scalable. Schemes
with High scalability are assigned 1 point in our ranking system.
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o Moderate – Schemes that will have some difficulty in handling increasing
traffic density are considered moderately scalable. Schemes with
Moderate scalability are assigned 0.5 points in our ranking system.
o Low - Schemes that will have substantial difficulty in accepting increasing
traffic density are considered to have low implementation scalability.
Schemes with Low scalability are assigned 0 points in our ranking system.
•

Compatibility - Evaluates the proposed security solution based on its impact on
current operations. Feasible schemes should not excessively impact current
hardware and software standards. Our ranking system deducts 0 points for
schemes that require no changes, 1 point for schemes that require changes to
the existing infrastructure and an additional 1 point for schemes that require
changes to the existing ADS-B protocol.

Table 2 lists the security schemes in descending order, from easiest to integrate
into the current system to the most difficult. Based on our ranking system for
Implementation Considerations, the maximum score for a security scheme would be 3,
having a low implementation difficulty and cost, a high scalability and be completely
compatible with the existing ADS-B communications system. From the rankings shown
in Table 2, we can see that Kalman filtering, MAC and wide-area multilateration security
schemes are the most compatible with the existing ADS-B infrastructure and protocol.
All three approaches have a low implementation difficulty, have relatively low cost, are
scalable and have a high degree of compatibility with the current system.
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Implementation Considerations
Type
Kalman Filtering

Message
Authentication
Codes

Wide Area
Multilateration

Data Fusion

μTESLA

Physical Layer
Authentication
Distance
Bounding

Spread Spectrum

(Lightweight) PKI

Difficulty

Cost

Scalability

Compatibility

Low

Low

High

1

1

1

0

Low

Low

High

Key distribution infrastructure, minor change
to ADS-B protocol.

1

1

1

-1

Low

Medium

Medium

1

0.5

0.5

Low

High

Medium

1

0

0.5

0

Medium

Medium

High

Protocol requires a new message type for key
publishing.

0.5

0.5

1

-1

Medium

High

Medium

0.5

0

0.5

High

Medium

Low

0

0.5

0

High

High

Medium

0

0

0.5

-2

High

High

Medium

Key distribution infrastructure and changes in
protocol and message handling needed.

0

0

0.5

-2

Overall
Score

No additional messages needed. Separate
software system.
3

2

Utilizes a separate hardware system. No
change to existing ADS-B required.
0

2

No change in ADS-B required. Requires
independent system(s).
1.5

1

Requires additional hardware/software. No
modifications to the ADS-B protocol.
-1

0

New messages and protocol needed.
-1

-0.5

Requires new hardware and a new physical
layer. Requires modifications to the ADS-B
protocol.
-1.5

-1.5

Table 2. Scheme Implementation Considerations
The most difficult security approaches to integrate are public key infrastructure and
spread spectrum. Due to the need to modify the existing hardware and protocol, these
schemes are the least desirable from an implementation complexity viewpoint.
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Evaluation of Scheme Security Provided
We next compare the different security schemes by the type of security provided
by the approach. In Table 3, we evaluate the following security scheme properties:
•

Injection / Modification –Indicates whether or not the scheme offers protection
against target injection and/or message modification attacks. Schemes that offer
protection against these attacks are assigned 1 point in our ranking system.

•

Eavesdropping – Specifies if the scheme offers protection against passive
listening. Schemes that offer protection against these attacks are assigned 1
point in our ranking system.

•

Jamming - Considers how well the proposed scheme can protect against signal
jamming attacks. Schemes that offer protection against these attacks are
assigned 1 point in our ranking system.

•

Denial of Service Mitigation - Shows whether or not the proposed security
solution offers protection against target injection and/or message modification
attacks. Schemes that offer protection against these attacks are assigned 1 point
in our ranking system.

Table 3 lists the security schemes in descending order based on the types of
security protection offered by the approach. In our ranking system for Security
Provided, the maximum score for a security scheme would be 4 if a scheme offered
protection against all attack categories.
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Security Provided
Type

Injection /
Modification

Eavesdropping

Jamming

DoS
Mitigation

Spread
Spectrum

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

0

1

1

1

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

1

1

0

1

Yes

No

No

Yes

1

0

0

1

Yes

No

No

Yes

1

0

0

1

Yes

No

No

No

1

0

0

0

Yes

No

No

No

1

0

0

0

Yes

No

No

No

1

0

0

0

Yes

No

No

No

1

0

0

0

Yes

No

No

No

1

0

0

0

(Lightweight)
PKI

Physical Layer
Authentication

Data Fusion

Message
Authentication
Codes

μTESLA

Wide Area
Multilateration

Distance
Bounding

Kalman
Filtering

Overall
Score

3

3

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

Table 3. Scheme Security Provided
Most of the security schemes that are currently being explored focus on attacks
of the message injection and modification type. There is currently not a great deal of
interest in protection against passive listeners, even though eavesdropping is often the
first step in developing more sophisticated and problematic attacks [7]. This is primarily
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due to the difficulty in developing adequate protection against passive listening without
resorting to a full cryptographic solution. Of the security approaches we have reviewed,
only spread spectrum and PKI offer protection against passive listening. In addition,
spread spectrum is the only security scheme that offers protection against signal
jamming attacks. As a result these two schemes score highest in our ranking of Security
Provided.
Evaluation of Scheme Message Integrity Provided
The next comparison table we construct ranks the security schemes by the type
of message integrity offered. In Table 4, we evaluate the following security scheme
properties:
•

Data Integrity –Indicates whether or not the scheme ensures that the data is the
same as has been provided by the sender and has not been modified by any third
party. Schemes that offer this feature are assigned 1 point in our ranking
system.

•

Source Integrity – Specifies if the scheme can ensure that a message originates
from the participant that claims to have sent it. Schemes that offer this feature
are assigned 1 point in our ranking system.

•

Location Integrity - Considers how well the proposed scheme can determine that
a message originates from the location claimed in the message. Schemes that
offer this feature are assigned 1 point in our ranking system.
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Table 4 ranks the security schemes in descending order based on the level of
message integrity that the approach adds to the communications network. In our
ranking system for Message Integrity Provided, the maximum score for a security
scheme would be 3 if a scheme offered data integrity, source integrity and location
integrity for surveillance communications messages.
Message Integrity Provided
Type

Data
Integrity

Source
Integrity

Location
Integrity

(Lightweight)
PKI

Yes

Yes

Yes

1

1

1

No

Yes

Yes

0

1

1

No

Yes

No

0

1

0

No

Yes

No

0

1

0

No

Yes

No

0

1

0

No

Yes

Yes

0

1

1

No

No

Yes

0

0

1

No

No

No

0

0

0

No

No

No

0

0

0

Data Fusion

Physical Layer
Authentication

Message
Authentication
Codes

μTESLA

Kalman
Filtering

Distance
Bounding

Spread
Spectrum
Wide Area
Multilateration

Table 4. Scheme Features Provided
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Overall
Score

3

2

1

1

1

2

1

0

0

As we can see from the comparison in Table 4, only a full cryptographic public
key infrastructure can guarantee the integrity of received data [7]. Cryptographic
security solutions such as PKI, whether implemented symmetrically or asymmetrically,
are the only security schemes that offer protection in all three message integrity
categories. All other security approaches offer only a partial solution.
Summary of ADS-B Security Schemes
Table 5 summarizes the scores from Table 2 - Table 4 and provides an overall
ranking of the ADS-B security schemes discussed.

Type

Implementation
Considerations
Score

Security
Provided
Score

Message
Integrity
Score

Overall
Score

Kalman Filtering

3

1

2

6

Data Fusion

1.5

2

2

5.5

Message
Authentication
Codes

2

1

1

4

(Lightweight) PKI

-1.5

2

3

3.5

μTESLA

1

1

1

3

Wide Area
Multilateration

2

1

0

3

Physical Layer
Authentication

0

2

1

3

Spread Spectrum

-1.5

3

0

1.5

Distance
Bounding

-0.5

1

1

1.5

Table 5. Scheme Ranking Summary
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To review the scoring system defined in Table 2 - Table 4, the maximum score for
the Implementation Considerations of a security scheme is 3, the maximum score for
Security Provided is 4 and the maximum score for Message Integrity is 3 for a maximum
possible overall score of 10 in our ranking system. Based on the security scheme ranking
criteria outlined above, the three most cost-effective and feasible security solutions are
Kalman filtering, data fusion and message authentication codes.
As discussed in Chapter 6 and shown in Table 5, Kalman filtering for use in real
time positional claim verification is among the easiest of the schemes to implement.
Although Kalman filtering solutions provide limited security and message integrity, their
low overall adverse impact on the existing ADS-B communications system make them a
suitable security approach for integrating into the current surveillance system.
Data fusion schemes can be used to verify positional data obtained from within
the ADS-B surveillance system against data acquired from other, independent
surveillance sources such as PSR and SSR. As with Kalman filtering approaches, data
fusion provides additional security to the ADS-B surveillance system while also having a
high degree of compatibility with the current system. The obvious drawback to data
fusion is the requirement to maintain redundant sources of surveillance data. The
additional maintenance cost implies that the FAA will not achieve the cost reduction
benefits hoped for as part of the NextGen deployment, but the cost will certainly be less
than that of other proposed ADS-B security schemes.
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As we demonstrated with AA-MAC in Chapter 5, message authentication codes
can be implemented into the existing ADS-B message protocol with a minimal overall
adverse impact on the existing system. A security scheme that employs MAC would
provide protection against message injection and modification attacks, which are
considered to be among the most critical of the vulnerabilities in the current ADS-B
surveillance system. The nominal adverse impact on existing ADS-B communications
make MAC security schemes worth incorporating into the current system.
Although spread spectrum and pure cryptographic solutions scored low in our
ranking system, they are necessary schemes to consider in developing a post-NextGen
air traffic management system. As noted earlier in this chapter, spread spectrum is the
only security scheme that offers protection against signal jamming, while PKI is currently
the only method for ensuring data integrity. Therefore, both of these security schemes
should be considered essential security components in future air traffic management
systems.
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CHAPTER 8
FUTURE WORK & CONCLUSION

The FAA’s NextGen upgrade was intended to increase the air transportation
system capacity and safety while reducing its operational cost, but recent research
demonstrates that potential vulnerabilities in the implementation of the ADS-B
component of NextGen can be easily exploited with inexpensive and readily available
equipment. The FAA began to develop NextGen and ADS-B at a time when network
security was not a concern and the term “cybersecurity” did not exist. At that time, the
system development effort was focused on reliability, accuracy, ATC system operational
capacity, and range [10]. Since then, network attacks have become an everyday
occurrence and the need for robust security measures are now a crucial network design
consideration. In addition, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 exposed how
vulnerable our global air transportation system is to those seeking to exploit inherent
weaknesses in the system with nefarious intent.
The FAA projects a 48% increase in domestic commercial air travel between 2014
and 2034. According to the FAA’s most recent Aerospace Forecast, U.S. commercial air
carrier system enplanements are anticipated to increase from approximately 775 million
in 2014 to over 1.150 billion by 2034 [25]. Based on this expected increase in air traffic,
it is clear that aviation authorities urgently need to mitigate the security problems in
NextGen. In addition to the expected increase in commercial air travel, as the FAA
moves to develop rules for integrating Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) into the air
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transportation system the need to safely accommodate the resulting increase in traffic
density becomes even more critically important.
As we have shown, there is no single comprehensive security solution to address
the vulnerabilities in the current implementation of ADS-B. Given the decades-long
timeframe required to develop, certify and deploy an air traffic management system and
its substantial costs to the aviation industry, a complete overhaul of ADS-B is not a
feasible consideration. Therefore, any solution to addressing the security shortcomings
in ADS-B will be a compromise and partial answer to addressing the vulnerabilities in the
system.
Viable ADS-B security solutions should seek to apply incremental changes to the
current system with an emphasis on backwards compatibility. However,
implementation expense and complexity of deployment should not be the only factors
taken into consideration; not having a security solution might prove to be far more
costly in the long run [7]. In view of this dichotomy, it seems logical to pursue two
different future research directions; one focused on addressing some of the weaknesses
in the current system and the other focused on developing a successor to ADS-B using
the existing system as a case study for future work.

NextGen Future Research
In our analysis of cost-effective solutions to establishing secure broadcast
authentication, we discuss AA-MAC as a security enhancement that has a high degree of
compatibility with the current ADS-B system. We acknowledge, however, that we have
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not addressed the problem of establishing a means of message source integrity for ADSB IN aircraft-to-aircraft messages. Future research into ADS-B message authentication
and AA-MAC should work on developing source integrity solutions for ADS-B IN to
mitigate the threat of message injection/modification attacks between airborne ADS-B
senders and receivers.
Future work on security enhancements to the current ADS-B system could
explore the security benefits of integrating AA-MAC for secure broadcast authentication
with secure location verification techniques. The current Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System (STARS) air traffic control automation systems developed by
Raytheon assimilates and filters data taken from surveillance radar, ADS-B and
multilateration using Kalman filtering to verify target surveillance data [26]. Based on
our findings, it would seem beneficial to pursue research into incorporating message
authentication codes into these air traffic management automation systems. Combining
the plausibility checks and track estimation provided by multilateration, data fusion and
Kalman filtering with message authentication codes will greatly enhance the security of
the existing ADS-B implementation.

Post-NextGen Future Research
Since there will eventually be a successor to ADS-B, it is also important for air
traffic control system research to focus on the development of a secure surveillance
protocol. Those responsible for creating a post-NextGen system should use the existing
system as a case study and learn from the shortcomings inherent in the current ADS-B
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implementation. Air traffic management communications signal integrity, security,
resistance to jamming and a wider geographic coverage area are features that need to
be incorporated into a post-NextGen ATM system.
The evolution of a post-NextGen system must have secure message
authentication as a high priority. Taking into account the frequency capacity and
message length constraints of the current ADS-B scheme, the most suitable
cryptographic primitives need to be identified and developed into a post-NextGen
system. In addition, an appropriate communication protocol that accommodates both
air-to-air and air-to-ground messages must be identified. Equally important, a solution
to the key management problem must be resolved [8]. A study of public key
distribution and management for commercial aircraft in [13] defines a generic Airplane
Asset Distribution System (AADS) and discusses several potential solutions for managing
public keys that could be applied to a post-NextGen secure authentication scheme.
Adequate resistance to signal jamming must also be applied in a successor to
ADS-B. Spread spectrum signal modulation provides protection against both jamming
and DoS attacks, and should be considered in a follow-on air traffic management system
design. Since FHSS is less susceptible to environmental interference factors than DSSS,
it would seem that a frequency hopping approach would be more suitable for an air
traffic management network. However, this will require additional frequency channel
allocation for the network. Based on studies of L-band frequency allocation and
frequency interference characteristics discussed in [27] and [28], it seems reasonable
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that as the FAA moves to decommission some of its land-based NAVAIDS, there will be
additional L-band frequencies that could be re-allocated for use in a future ATM system.
These additional frequencies could be used in a FHSS scheme and would also mitigate
concerns over increased congestion on the 1090 MHz band caused by the projected
growth in air traffic.
An additional constraint of the current ADS-B implementation is the limited ADSB system coverage available for aircraft operating routes that transit over remote
locations of the globe. Aircraft operating on routes crossing bodies of water such as the
Gulf of Mexico are in communication with ADS-B stations placed on oil drilling
platforms, but no such solution is available for aircraft on long overwater oceanic
routes.
Given the LOS range limitations of the 1090 MHz signal, solutions need to be
developed for providing surveillance to aircraft operating in remote geographic
locations. In [29], the authors explore the feasibility of utilizing the Iridium NEXT
satellite constellation for use as ADS-B orbital stations. The authors study several cases
that analyze the coverage rate available from an orbital-based system. The possibility of
utilizing sub-orbital ADS-B stations is discussed in [30], where the authors experimented
with stratospheric balloons to extend the ADS-B signal coverage range to over 300 NM
as a proof-of-concept for ADS-B range extension. Development of a post-NextGen ATM
system should seek to incorporate technologies that will permit accurate and timely
surveillance of aircraft operating on routes that transit over remote geographic regions.
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Conclusion
There is considerable current interest in providing security to NextGen and the
ADS-B protocol. In this research, we discuss the existing work being done in ADS-B
security and analyze cost-effective solutions to mitigating ADS-B vulnerabilities.
NextGen and its GNSS-based surveillance component offer the potential to increase
efficiency and capacity in the air traffic management system, but likely leave it more
vulnerable to attack than the current radar-based surveillance system.
After reviewing the available alternatives, it is apparent that the solutions
currently being researched can only be a compromise, providing a less than ideal
improvement to the security of the present scheme. In order to implement
comprehensive security into the ATM system, new message types and protocols need to
be developed. The impact of increasing traffic density needs to be taken into account,
and new protocols must be designed with scalability in mind in order to accommodate
growth in ATM system communication network load. In planning for security solution in
a post-NextGen ATM system, developers will need to incorporate both secure broadcast
authentication and secure location verification in order to provide a more
comprehensive security solution than those considered viable for the current
surveillance system infrastructure.
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APPENDIX A: AA-MAC TEST PROGRAM

def parse_adsb(msg):
'''
Function to parse an ADS-B message into its main components. The Function
converts the hexadecimal message into to its binary string equivalent and
processes it into the 5 ADS-B message components.
The function takes 1 parameter:
@param msg: String value representing a legitimate 112-bit ADS-B data
packet in hexadecimal format.
@return: Returns a list of binary strings representing the ADS-B message
components.
'''
msg = bin(int(msg,16))[2:]
DF = ''
CA = ''
AA = ''
Data = ''
PI = ''
for i in range(5):
DF += msg[i]
for i in range(5,8):
CA += msg[i]
for i in range(8,32):
AA += msg[i]
for i in range(32,88):
Data += msg[i]
for i in range(88,112):
PI += msg[i]
return [DF,CA,AA,Data,PI]
# End Function Code ------------------------------------------------------------
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def create_block(hash, b_size=24):
'''
Function to create a hash of the designated block size using bit-wise XOR.
Note that this implementation is designed to be a simple demonstration and is
not intended to be computationally efficient. There are certainly better
data structures, such as mult-dimensional arrays, that would yield far more
efficient algorithms than this iterative example.
The function takes 1 required and 1 optional parameter:
@param hash: String value representing a legitimate 112-bit ADS-B data
packet in hexadecimal format.
@param b_size: Integer value of the desired hash block size. The default
value is 24.
@return Returns binary string of length b_size.
'''
# convert the hexadecimal hash value into its binary string equivalent
hash = bin(int(hash,16))[2:]
# setup the values used to iterate over the binary hash string
h_size = len(hash)
idx = 0
b_hash = 0
# iterate over the binary hash in b_size increments and XOR the substrings
if h_size%b_size != 0:
n = h_size/b_size
else:
n = h_size/b_size - 1
for i in range(n):
idx += b_size
if idx < h_size - b_size:
b_hash = int(hash[idx:idx+b_size],2) ^ b_hash
else:
b_hash = int(hash[idx:],2) ^ b_hash

return bin(b_hash)[2:]

# End Function Code ------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_hash(msg, key, b_size=24, n=1000, xor=True):
'''
Test function for detecting message authentication code failures, where the
shortened hash is duplicated on distinctly different hash inputs. The
message simulates a message error by randomly changing one of the 112 bits
in the ADS-B message. The test compares the two hashes generated as the
MAC to test for collisions due to the shortened hash. The function
prints out the number of collisions detected as a percentage of the total
number of iterations.
The function takes 2 required and 3 optional parameters:
@param msg: Hexadecimal string representing a legitimate 112-bit ADS-B data
packet.
@param key: String value of the secret authentication key.
@param b_size: Integer value of the desired hash block size. The default
value is 24.
@param n: Integer value of the number of comparison iterations to perform.
@param xor: Boolean value to determine if the create_block function is to
be used to create the shortened MAC, or is a simple substring of the
hash is to be used.
'''
import numpy as np
from Crypto.Hash import MD5
msg = parse_adsb(msg)[3]
failure = 0
for _ in range(n):
# simulate error by modifying a random bit in msg
i = np.random.randint(len(msg))
if msg[i] == '0':
msg_mod = msg[:i] + '1' + msg[i+1:]
else:
msg_mod = msg[:i] + '0' + msg[i+1:]
h = MD5.new()
h.update(msg+key)
h_msg = h.hexdigest()
h = MD5.new()
h.update(msg_mod+key)
h_msg_mod = h.hexdigest()
if xor == True:
test_msg = create_block(h_msg, b_size)
test_msg_mod = create_block(h_msg_mod, b_size)
else:
test_msg = bin(int(h_msg,16))[2:b_size+2]
test_msg_mod = bin(int(h_msg_mod,16))[2:b_size+2]
if test_msg == test_msg_mod:
print test_msg
print test_msg_mod
print '\n'
failure += 1
if failure != 0:
print 'Failure percentage = {:.6f}%'.format(failure/float(n))
else:
print 'Test passed 100%'

# End Function Code ------------------------------------------------------------
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APPENDIX B: SINGLE-VARIABLE KALMAN FILTER PROGRAM
import random
import numpy
import pylab

class kalman_linear(object):
'''
This class implements a linear Kalman filter and uses the parameter names as
defined in [19]. This Kalman filter implementation is adapted from code
written by Greg Czerniak [31].
Instances of the kalman_linear class have 7 required parameters:
@param A: Numpy matrix representing
@param B: Numpy matrix representing
@param H: Numpy matrix representing
@param x: Numpy matrix representing
@param P: Numpy matrix representing
@param Q: Numpy matrix representing
@param R: Numpy matrix representing
'''
def __init__(self,A, B, H, x, P, Q,
self.state_trans = A
self.ctrl = B
self.obs = H
self.init_state_est = x
self.init_cov_est = P
self.proc_err_est = Q
self.meas_err_est = R

the
the
the
the
the
the
the

state transition matrix.
control matrix.
observation matrix.
initial state estimate.
initial covariance estimate.
error in process estimate.
error in measurement estimate.

R):

# End __init__ Code ------------------------------------------------------------

def get_state(self):
'''
Method to return the inital state estimate.
@return: Returns a numpy matrix containing the initial state estimate
value.
'''
return self.init_state_est

# End Method Code --------------------------------------------------------------
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def step(self, ctrl_vec, meas_vec):
'''
Method to perform the Kalman filtering prediction, observation and update
steps.
'''
# Prediction step
pred_state_est = ( self.state_trans * self.init_state_est )\
+ ( self.ctrl * ctrl_vec )
pred_prob_est = ( (self.state_trans * self.init_cov_est )\
* numpy.transpose(self.state_trans ) )\
+ self.proc_err_est
# Observation step
# residual - the discrepancy between the predicted and actual measurement
residual = meas_vec - ( self.obs * pred_state_est )
residual_cov = ( self.obs * pred_prob_est * numpy.transpose(self.obs) )\
+ self.meas_err_est
# Update step
kalman_gain = pred_prob_est * numpy.transpose(self.obs)\
* numpy.linalg.inv(residual_cov)
self.init_state_est = pred_state_est + ( kalman_gain * residual )
# Determine the size of and create the identity matrix
size = self.init_cov_est.shape[0]
id_matrix = numpy.eye(size)
# Update the covariance based on the results of the previous steps
self.init_cov_est = (id_matrix - ( kalman_gain * self.obs ) )\
* pred_prob_est
# End Method Code -------------------------------------------------------------# End kalman_linear Class definition ------------------------------------------class noise_generator:
'''
This class implements a random noise generator for generating a noisy data
series used to test a kalman_linear class instance.
Instances of the noise_generator class require 2 parameters:
@param mean: Float value of the mean for creating the Gaussian distribution.
@param std_dev: Float value of the standard deviation used to create the
Gaussian distribution.
'''
def __init__(self, mean, std_dev):
self.mean = mean
self.std_dev = std_dev

# End __init__ Code ------------------------------------------------------------

def get_noise(self):
'''
Method to generate a random float value from a Gaussian distrubution.

@return: Returns a random Float value from the generated Gaussian
distribution.
'''
return random.gauss(self.mean, self.std_dev)

# End Method Code --------------------------------------------------------------

86

def get_mean(self):
'''
Method to return the mean of the Gaussian distribution. This value
represents the "actual" value that is being obscured by the noisy data.
@return: Returns the float value passed in as the Gaussian distribution
mean.
'''
return self.mean
# End Method Code -------------------------------------------------------------# End noise_generator Class definition -----------------------------------------

def test_kalman(A, B, H, x, P, Q, R, noise_mean, noise_std_dev, data_size):
'''
Test function for testing a kalman_linear class instance on a randomly
generated noisy data series.
The function generates a plot of the noisy data series, the estimated value
returned by the linear Kalman filtering function and the actual value that
the noisy data would be otherwise obscuring.
The function takes 10 required parameters:
@param A: Numpy matrix reperesenting the state transition matrix.
@param B: Numpy matrix reperesenting the control matrix.
@param H: Numpy matrix reperesenting the observation matrix.
@param x: Numpy matrix representing the initial state estimate.
@param P: Numpy matrix representing the initial covariance estimate.
@param Q: Numpy matrix representing the error in process estimate.
@param R: Numpy matrix representing the error in measurement estimate.
@param mean: Float value of the mean for creating the Gaussian distribution.
@param std_dev: Float value of the standard deviation used to create the
Gaussian distribution.
@param data_size: Integer value indicating the desired size of the test
data series.
'''
# Create class instances
filter = kalman_linear(A,B,H,xhat,P,Q,R)
generator = noise_generator(noise_mean, noise_std_dev)
# Create storage for generated data
noisy_data = []
actual_val = []
kalman = []
# Create the noisy and filtered linear data series
for i in range(data_size):
noisy_val = generator.get_noise()
noisy_data.append(noisy_val)
actual_val.append(generator.get_mean())
kalman.append(filter.get_state()[0,0])
filter.step(numpy.matrix([0]), numpy.matrix([noisy_val]))

# Create plot of the noisy and filtered data
pylab.plot(range(data_size), noisy_data, 'r', range(data_size),
kalman, 'g', range(data_size), actual_val, 'b')
pylab.xlabel('Time')
pylab.ylabel('Noisy Data')
pylab.title('Estimation of Noisy Data Series with Kalman Filter')
pylab.legend(('Noisy Values','Kalman Filtered Values', 'Actual Value'))
pylab.show()

# End Function Code ------------------------------------------------------------
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